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Abstract: 
In spite of its predominant economic weight in developing countries, little is known about informal 
sector income dynamics vis-à-vis the formal sector. The few works using household surveys to tackle 
this issue, mainly consider some emerging countries. As a matter of consequence, there is still no way 
to generalize the (diverging) results to very poor part of the developing world.  Taking advantage of 
the rich 1-2-3 Surveys dataset in Madagascar, in particular its four waves panel data (2000, 2001, 2003 
and 2004), we assess the magnitude of various formal/informal sector earnings gaps while addressing 
heterogeneity issues at three different levels: the worker, the job (wage employment vs. self-
employment) and the earnings distribution. The questions asked are the following: Is there an informal 
sector job earnings penalty? Do some informal sector jobs provide pecuniary premiums? Which ones? 
Do possible gaps vary along the earnings distribution? Standard earnings equations are estimated at 
the mean and at various conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution. In particular, we estimate 
fixed effects quantile regressions to control for unobserved individual characteristics, focusing 
particularly on heterogeneity within both the formal and informal sector categories. Our results 
suggest that the informal sector earnings gap highly depends on the workers’ job status and on their 
relative position in the earnings distribution. Penalties may in some cases turn into premiums. By 
comparing our results with studies in other developing countries, we draw conclusions highlighting the 
Madagascar’s labour market specificity. 
Key words: informal employment, earnings gap, transition matrix, quantile regressions, panel data, 
Madagascar. 
Résumé 
En dépit d'un poids économique massif dans les pays en développement, on sait peu de choses sur la 
structure des revenus du secteur informel, notamment en comparaison du secteur formel. Les quelques 
papiers qui ont abordé cette question à travers des enquêtes ménages traitent surtout de quelques pays 
émergents. En conséquence, il n'est pas possible de généraliser leurs conclusions, d'ailleurs 
divergentes, aux pays les plus pauvres notamment africains. En mobilisant une base de données unique 
tirée des enquêtes 1-2-3 à Madagascar, conduites par les soins des auteurs, en particulier des quatre 
vagues de panel (2000, 2001, 2003 et 2004), nous examinons l'ampleur du différentiel de rémunération 
formel/informel en tenant compte de l'hétérogénéité à trois niveaux différents : celle des travailleurs, 
de leurs emplois (salariés vs non salariés) et de la distribution des revenus. Les questions abordées 
sont les suivantes : les travailleurs du secteur informel sont-ils toujours financièrement pénalisés ? Si 
non, quels sont les emplois de ce secteur qui bénéficient d'une prime et à combien se monte-t-elle ? 
Les écarts varient-ils au long de la distribution ? Nous estimons des équations de gains à la moyenne et 
à différents points de la distribution des revenus (régressions quantile). Dans les deux cas, des modèles 
à effets fixes sont estimés de contrôler les caractéristiques inobservables des individus, en se centrant 
sur l'hétérogénéité interne des deux secteurs (formel et informel). Nos résultats montrent que le 
différentiel de rémunération dépend fortement du statut dans l'emploi et de la position relative dans la 
distribution des revenus. Dans certains cas, le secteur informel apparaît plus rémunérateur. La 
comparaison avec les études réalisées dans d'autres PED permet de mettre en lumière les spécificités 
du marché du travail à Madagascar. 
Mots Clés : Emploi informel, écarts de rémunération, matrice de transition, régressions quantile, 
données de panel, Madagascar. 




In spite of its predominant economic weight in developing countries, little is known about 
the informal sector's income dynamics vis-à-vis the formal sector. Some works have been 
done in this field using household surveys, but they only consider some emerging Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico; Gong et al., 2004; Perry et 
al., 2007; Bargain and Kwenda, 2011) and more recently South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania 
for Africa (Falco et al., 2010) and Vietnam for Asia (Nguyen et al., 2011). As a matter of 
consequence, there is still no way to generalize these (diverging) results to other parts of the 
developing world, in particular in countries where the informal sector is the most 
widespread (Sub-Saharan African, and more generally poor countries). 
From a labour market perspective, two competing views regarding informality are at stake in 
the literature: the exclusion and the exit hypotheses, following Hirschman masterpiece 
(Perry et al., 2007). The first one, also called the “dualist approach”, is an extension of the 
works by Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970). It is based on a dual labour market 
model where the informal sector is considered as a residual component of this market totally 
unrelated to the formal economy. It is a subsistence economy that only exists because the 
formal economy is incapable of providing enough jobs, condemned to disappear with the 
development process. Informal workers, suffering from poor labour conditions, are queuing 
for better jobs in the formal sector. The second one, also known as the “legalist approach” 
considers that the informal sector is made up of micro-entrepreneurs who prefer to operate 
informally to evade the economic regulations (de Soto, 1989); this conservative school of 
thought is in sharp contrast to the former in that the choice of informality is voluntary due to 
the exorbitant legalisation costs associated with formal status and registration. 
Recent empirical evidence shows, however, that the real situation is a mix of these two 
hypotheses. Confirming Field’s stylized assessment (1990), they stressed the huge 
heterogeneity among informal jobs, which combine two main components (Roubaud, 1994; 
Maloney, 1999, 2004; Perry et al., 2007; Bargain and Kwenda, 2011): a lower-tier segment, 
where occupying an informal job is a constraint choice (exclusion hypothesis); an upper-tier 
segment, in which informal jobs are chosen for better earnings, and non-pecuniary benefits 
(exit hypothesis). Usually, the former segment is assimilated to the informal wage jobs, 
while the latter is associated with the self-employed jobs. Therefore, whether one segment is 
predominant over the other is an empirical question, depending on local circumstances. To 
test these alternative views, one major strand of literature focuses on the estimation of 
earning gaps. Embedded in reveled preferences principle, and considering income as a proxy 
of individual utility, the approach assumes that if informal workers earn more than their 
formal counterparts (controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics), one could 
have good presumptions that they have deliberately chosen the informal sector. This may 
not be true for all informal workers. Thus, the challenge is to identify segments of jobs (for 
instance by job status) or position in the income distribution where informal workers get a 
higher pay. In this paper, our objective is to shed light on these alternative views in the case 
of Madagascar using the formal/informal earning gaps approach. We take advantage of the 
rich 1-2-3 Surveys dataset in Madagascar, specifically designed to capture the informal 
sector, and in particular its four-wave panel data (2000-2001-2002-2004), to ask the 
following questions: Is there an informal sector job earnings penalty? Do some informal 
sector jobs provide pecuniary premiums?  Which ones? Do possible gaps vary along the 
earnings distribution? 
While most of the papers on this topic are drawn from (emerging) Latin American or some 
African countries, Madagascar represents an interesting case. It has experienced spectacular 
social, economic and political changes in the recent period. Impressive economic growth of 
the last decade has entailed a remarkable drop in poverty figures, drastic changes of the 
labour market structure, but also a surge in earnings inequality as further trade liberalization 
and world integration have been developed. Over the past fifteen years or so, Madagascar 
also has embarked on a process of economic liberalization, similarly to many African 
countries undergoing structural adjustment. In spite of the dynamism of its Export 
Processing Zones (EPZ) in the 1990s, the country remains however today one of the poorest 
countries in the world.  
Our empirical analysis consists of assessing the magnitude of different types of informal-
formal earnings gaps using OLS and quantile regressions. While many pieces of work rely 
on proxy variables to identify the informal sector, we use the official international definition 
of the informal sector elaborated by the ILO (1993), including all non-registered non-farm 
unincorporated enterprises (household businesses). Standard earnings equations are 
estimated at the mean and at various conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution. In 
particular, we estimate fixed effects quantile regressions to control for unobserved 
individual characteristics, focusing particularly on heterogeneity within both the formal and 
informal employment categories. Our purpose is to address the important issue of 
heterogeneity at two levels: the worker level, taking into account individual unobserved 
characteristics; the job level, comparing wage workers with self-employed workers. 
Our results suggest that the informal sector earnings gap highly depends on the workers’ job 
status (wage employment vs. self-employment) and on their relative position in the earnings 
distribution. Penalties may in some cases turn into premiums. In particular, while informal 
sector workers suffer penalties vis-à-vis formal workers, this feature is mainly due to 
informal sector wage earners. In fact, informal self-employed workers receive a premium 
vis-à-vis formal wage workers, which is increasing along the pay ladder. Gender issues are 
also examined. By comparing our results with studies using similar methodologies in other 
developing countries, we draw conclusions highlighting the Malagasy’s labour market 
specificity. Surprisingly, this specificity puts Madagascar closer to Mexico (and to a lesser 
extend Brazil) than to South Africa, where the informal-formal sector gap, although 
decreasing along the earnings distribution, is always negative, even at the highest end of the 
distribution. Madagascar, although a much poorer country, already exhibits a more 
integrated labour market, which is a characteristic of emerging Latin American countries 
compared to the dualistic structure expected for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the context, the data 
and some descriptive elements of income dynamics in the recent period, while Section 3 
focuses on the econometric approach to assess formal-informal earnings gaps. Empirical 
results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Context, Labour Market Dynamics and Data 
 Context  
After a long period of economic recession which started with the country’s independence in 
1960 and interrupted only by very short periods of growth, Madagascar experienced an 
exceptional period of economic expansion between 1997 and 2001. Several factors, both 
economic and political, drove this favorable development. Firstly, the political stability since 
the election of Didier Ratsiraka in 1996 and agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions 
to reduce debt created a favorable environment for investment. Secondly, the development 
of EPZs attracted foreign industry, in particular textile, which stimulated exports and 
employment. The rise of tourism also contributed to economic growth.  
The presidential elections of December 2001 triggered a serious political crisis that lasted 
six months and had catastrophic economic effects (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2002). The 
candidate Marc Ravalomanana challenged the first round results that he claimed were 
fraudulent. He maintained to have won the elections and refused the holding of a second 
round, against the incumbent president, Didier Ratsiraka. After huge demonstrations and 
general strikes, the conflict intensified as roadblocks around Antananarivo were set up by 
followers of Didier Ratsiraka in an attempt to paralyze the economy of the capital city. 
Finally, Marc Ravalomana was proclaimed president in May, and Didier Ratsiraka left the 
country in July 2002. 
The political crisis had disastrous effects on the economy: GDP collapsed by 12.7% and 
inflation was close to 16% in 2002 (Gubert and Robilliard, 2010). Exports and foreign 
direct investments fell sharply, unemployment rose by 71% between mid-2001 and the end 
of 2002 (Cling et al., 2005). Despite the severity of the economic downturn, recovery was 
quick, with GDP growth of 9.8% in 2003 and around 5% in the two following years. 
However, unemployment doubled between 2001 and 2005 and in the main urban areas 
increased from 4.4% to 12%. Income per capita in 2004 also remained under its pre-crisis 
level (Gubert and Robilliard, 2010). 
These macroeconomic turbulences had a direct impact on the labour market dynamics and 
households living conditions. Between 1997 and 2001, the growth process translated into a 
significant decline in the informal sector (Table 1). Accounting for 60% of employment in 
Madagascar’s capital Antananarivo at the beginning of the period, its share decreased to 
53% in 2001.1 This drop occurred in a context of public administration and state enterprise 
downsizing, as part of the structural adjustment program. In terms of employment, this 
process mainly benefited the private formal sector. This structural change was mainly due 
to the rapid development of EPZ and at least to some extent to the expansion of formal 
domestic enterprises. The average annual growth rate of employment over the period was 
27% in EPZ but only 3% in the informal sector. this led to a tripling of the share of EPZs in 
total employment between 1995 and 2001, from 3% to more than 10%, while the share of 
private formal sector jobs remained stagnant at 25% (Cling et al., 2005).  
The general strikes, roadblocks and the vacancy of power caused by the political crisis in 
the first half of 2002 reversed this trend. In only one year, the informal sector gained nearly 
8 percentage points, erasing all the progress in the formalization process observed during 
the previous four years, absorbing the laid-off workers from closing formal enterprises and 
the new entrants, deprived from any alternative source of jobs. While both dependent and 
independent informal employment increased, the growth in the number of informal 
entrepreneurs was much faster than the overall increase in the number of workers. This is a 
sign that informal sector employment growth is extensive rather than intensive, as it 
happens mainly through the creation of new firms rather than the expansion of employment 
in existing firms. Interestingly, in the period of growth (1998-2001), although dependent 
informal labour was absorbed in formal enterprises, the absolute number of firms continued 
to increase, even faster than the overall growth of the employed labour force. This suggests 
that the informal sector consists of both workers queuing for a formal job and voluntary 
entrepreneurs (Vaillant et al., 2011). Conversely, in the period of crisis and the following 
recovery, the decrease in formal employment seems to have been mainly compensated by 
an increase in informal independent labour (the share in total employment increases from 
35% to 38.6%), rather than informal hired or family labour, suggesting that existing firms 
were not able to absorb the surplus labour released by the formal sector, and most of these 
workers started an informal activity. Additionally, an important fraction of the fast growth 
in the number of informal firms is explained by new entries on the labour market. The EPZ 
paid the highest tribute to the crisis, employment being divided by nearly three. From 2002 
onwards, the EPZ recovers its pre-crisis number of jobs. Yet, recovery of domestic formal 
enterprises seemed to be limited (Cling et al., 2009). 
At the macro level, this contra-cyclical evolution of the informal sector employment, taken 
as a whole, seems to confirm the dualistic hypothesis quoted in the introduction. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the subsequent trends. As a second political turmoil occurred 
in 2009 combined with the international financial crisis, which resulted in a new drastic 
shock, the informal sector ‘re-colonized’ the labour market. The informal sector 
                                                          
1
 As in other cities in SSA, the informal sector represents the largest share of employment in Antananarivo. 
Even if its share is 10 to 15 percentage points lower than in other West African urban centers, it remains the 
first job provider, totalizing more than one out of two jobs. 
employment absorbed nearly two thirds of the labour force in 2010 (65%), its highest share 
ever (Rakotomanana et al., 2010). 
 
Table 1. Share of employment by institutional sector 1995-2010 (%) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2006 2010 
Public sector  14.2 14.3 13.0 13.2 13.1 10.6 10.7 11.2 10.4 8.8 7.8 
Private formal sector  25.1 22.6 22.9 24.6 24.2 25.3 25.9 24.9 22.2 25.2 22.4 
EPZs 3.1 4.4 4.6 5.5 6.7 8.9 10.2 4.1 8.9 8.0 4.8 
Informal sector  57.6 58.8 59.6 56.7 56.0 55.3 53.1 59.9 58.4 58.0 65.1 
   dependent 27.6 22.6 25.2 22.8 21.5 20.3 18.9 21.3 19.9 21.7 30.6 
   independent 30.0 36.2 34.4 33.9 34.5 35.0 34.2 38.6 38.5 36.3 34.5 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total (1,000 jobs) 415 435 455 476 500 530 540 538 604 636 746 
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1, 1995-2010, MADIO, DIAL & INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Note: Private formal sector figures do not include EPZs.  
The growth process registered at the national level until 2001 is confirmed by the survey 
data that will be used in this paper. Urban households benefited most from the situation. In 
Antananarivo, the real average labour income increased by 53% between 1995 and 2001, 
which corresponds to a huge 8% annual growth rate, an unprecedented pace in Madagascar’s 
history (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2002 & 2010). Consequently, the poverty incidence 
decreased from 39% to 19% while income inequality was also reduced. The 2002 crisis 
stopped this positive trend: the unemployment rate nearly doubled along with a massive 
increase in time-related underemployment2 and child labour. Real incomes dropped by 5%. 
Thereafter, despite the quick macroeconomic recovery, household living conditions 
stagnated: in 2004, earnings were as low as in 2002, and in 2006, they were only 2% higher 
than during the crisis.  
In terms of labour income, the informal sector is, as expected, the lowest paying segment of 
the urban labour market, with jobs in the public sector at the top of the earnings ladder (first 
row of Table 2). Interestingly, although it is significant, the earning gap with EPZs jobs is 
quite low, stressing the potential trade-offs in choosing one sector or the other for low skill 
workers, especially women (Glick and Roubaud, 2006). The decline in informal sector 
employment in the second half of the nineties was accompanied by large income gains from 
informal activities. Between 1995 and 2001, real average informal earnings increased by 
66%, this is more than the 53% registered over all sectors together. Given that the informal 
sector is less exposed to international competition than the formal tradable sector, informal 
firms have been able to benefit from the increase in domestic demand. In spite of the lower 
income elasticity of their products and of a decreasing market share for consumption goods 
(-6 percentage points), informal goods still satisfied nearly three quarters of household 
consumption in 2001. If only food is considered the share catered by the informal sector was 
even 95% (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010). 
Conversely, in 2002, the average income in the informal sector was reduced by 11%, while 
the decline for the whole labour market was ‘only’ 5%. Shrinking aggregate demand 
combined with the absorption of labour quitting the formal sector are likely to be the main 
                                                          
2
 A person is in a situation of time-related underemployment if he works less than 35 hours a week and wishes 
to work more. 
drivers of this sharp contraction. The shift from formal to informal consumption goods 
following the impoverishment of the population was not sufficient to counterbalance the two 
former effects (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010). On the contrary, the formal sector was 
able to maintain real wages, but at the expense of a massive reduction in jobs. These figures 
are consistent with the common belief that the formal sector would adjust during downturns 
through quantity, while price adjustment would be the main mechanism at work in the 
informal sector. Subsequently, informal sector incomes progressively recover part of their 
purchasing power, at least up to 2009, before a new drastic drop occurred. 
Table 2. Level and growth rates of earnings by institutional sector 1995-2010 
 Level Real growth rate (1995=100) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2006 2010 
Public sector  185 95.8 111.2 129.8 144.1 157.9 164.7 157.6 158.0 166.5 155.4 
Private formal 
sector (excl. EPZs)  136 91.7 123.3 137.8 133.5 143.2 143.8 148.3 149.8 151.7 126.0 
EPZs 79 131.4 137.8 152.1 155.4 167.7 168.5 169.9 171.8 176.2 176.8 
Informal sector  69 112.1 125.6 143.8 161.9 165.3 166.2 147.8 153.6 158.0 138.5 
Total  103 100.1 117.8 136.3 145.4 150.1 153.1 144.9 145.4 148.6 128.6 
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1, 1995-2010, INSTAT/DIAL/MADIO; authors' calculations. 
Notes: The first column corresponds to monthly earnings in 1,000 Fmg; the other columns to the earnings 
dynamics compared to 1995.  
Up to now, we analyzed informal sector dynamics through repeated cross sections of labour 
force survey data. However, such data provide only an aggregate and partial view of the 
process at stake. Understanding better the informal sector dynamics requires to dig beyond 
average along two dimensions, by taking into account its intrinsic heterogeneity and 
individual mobility across sectors. To overcome these limitations, we will take advantage of 
the availability of panel data for the sub-period 2000-2004 to accurately focus on our main 
objective, i.e. to assess the formal/informal earnings gaps. 
  
Data description  
The data used in this paper are drawn from the 1-2-3 Surveys conducted in the capital city, 
Antananarivo, since 1995 by the National Statistics Institute, with the technical assistance 
of DIAL, on behalf of the authors (Rakotomanana et al., 2003). The 1-2-3 Survey is a mixed 
household/enterprise survey specifically designed at capturing the informal sector in all its 
dimensions (Razafindrakoto et al., 2009). Phase 1 is an extended labour force survey, 
providing accurate labour market indicators, including, among others, main and secondary 
jobs of every member aged 10 years and over by status of firm (formal/informal). Phase 2 is 
an enterprise survey, carried out on a representative subsample of informal firms identified 
in Phase 1 and seeking to measure their main economic and productive characteristics. 
Phase 3 is an income and expenditure type household survey, which sample is drawn from 
Phase 1 and which aim is to estimate the weight of the formal and informal sectors in 
household consumption by product and household type. 
In terms of sample design, the 1-2-3 Surveys are a classical two-stage stratified random 
survey, covering the ordinary households in the agglomeration of Antananarivo. 3  The 
sample size is constant over years and quite large for this kind of geographical coverage. 
Approximately, 3,000 households and all household members have been interviewed each 
year (see details Table 3). Among all individuals, more than 9,000 belong are 18 years and 
over, of which around 5,500 held a job in the considered years.4 For the purpose of this 
paper we use exclusively four successive rounds of Phase 1 (2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004), 
which presents the advantage of including a panel component. From 2000, the 2,999 
households have been re-interviewed the three subsequent rounds. In order to keep constant 
the total number of households surveyed each year (3,000), the disappeared or non-
responding households have been randomly renewed from one round to the other. 
 
Table 3. The panel structure of the 1-2-3 Surveys 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004 
 2000  2001  2002  2004 
Cross section sample (household)  2,999  3,020  3,019  3,020 
Cross section sample (individual 18 years & over)  9,537  9,459 9,409  9,658 
Cross section sample (occupied workers) 5,685 5,499 5,196 5,272 
     
Panel (household) 2,999 2,559 2,607 2,396 
     
Panel (individual 18 years & over) 5,823 6,771 6,381 4,951 
- Observed 2 years 1,163  1,436  1,046  773 
- Observed 3 years 1,157 1,832 1,832 675 
- Observed 4 years (Balanced Panel)  3,503 3,503 3,503 3,503 
     
Panel (individual 18 years & over holding a job) 4,161 4,863 4,472 3,637 
- Observed 2 years 803 995 705 551 
- Observed 3 years 771 1,265 1,245 484 
- Observed 4 years (Balanced Panel) 2,587 2,603 2,522 2,602 
Source : 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Note: In Madagascar the working age population is defined as all individual aged 10 years and over. The 
number of observations of the balanced panel for occupied workers change a little bit as some individuals 
enter and exit the labour force. 
 
To build our panel, individuals being matched between the four rounds, we use a common 
individual identifier across years, cross-checked with name, gender, age and other 
individual information. After undertaking thorough data cleaning including checking 
consistency of time-invariant variables between the four survey rounds, we obtain a panel 
of 23,926 observations (individual*year) with useful information. The structure of the panel 
is described in Table 3. Among the 7,544 individuals in the working age population, 3,503 
are observed the four years (balanced panel), that is nearly half of our sample (47%); 24% 
are present thrice and 29% twice. If we restrict ourselves to the occupied population, 5,360 
                                                          
3
 The primary sample units are census enumeration areas and the secondary sample units correspond to 
households and individuals. For more details, see Rakotomanana et al. (2003). 
4
 The full sample consists in all members of the households surveyed in 2000. In this paper we restrict our 
analysis to the individuals aged 18 years old and over (in 2000), to better control for education achievement. 
Taking a lower threshold would lead to a censored education variable. Less than 5% of the individuals aged 18 
years and over are still at school.   
individual hold a job, and the distribution according to the number of time-observations is 
quite similar (48% for the balanced panel).  
As in any panel data analysis, potential selective attrition should be considered and 
addressed. The attrition rate from one year to the other is 13% in average, and is mainly due 
to demographic changes (marriage, migration, death), while economic factors (to find a job, 
etc.) are marginal. Comparisons of means and distribution of earnings and observables 
between the cross-section samples and the panel sub-sample suggest that selective attrition 
is not an issue. Age and matrimonial status are the only socio-demographic factors affecting 
attrition: panel individual are younger and are more often not married than non-panel 
individuals, but the gap is limited (33 vs. 36.8 years old; 48% vs. 37% are not married). 
More importantly, no significant difference in labour market related variables, in particular 
in earnings or type of jobs (formal vs. informal) are observed (Rakotomanana, 2011). 
Being specifically designed to capture informal sector jobs, the 1-2-3 Surveys allow us to 
capture the concept of informal sector following the international definition strictly (ILO, 
2003; European Commission et al., 1993). In Madagascar, the informal sector is defined as 
all private unincorporated enterprises that produce at least some of their goods and services 
for sale or barter, are not registered (statistics licence, supposed to be compulsory for all 
kind of businesses) or do not keep book accounts. Apart from our formal/informal sector 
divide, special care is dedicated to get reliable measures of variables where informality 
status may lead to sampling and measurement errors, due to its characteristics. In particular, 
the questionnaire includes a detail set of questions to capture information on activity status, 
the classical procedures leading to the under-declaration of informal sector workers 
participation for those with the weakest labour market attachment. We compute the labour 
income associated with each remunerated job. For wage workers, the survey capture their 
current monthly wage, while for self-employed workers earnings correspond to the  
disposable income (before taxation). For those who don't want to declare (or don't know) 
their precise earnings, a complementary question ask for intervals, proposed in detailed 
ranges (10) of minimum wage. Hourly earnings used in the econometric analysis are 
deduced using the total number of hours worked per month. Additionally, all the classical 
individual and household based socio-demographic variables are appended to our database. 
Finally, time deflators CPI are used to compute real earnings. 
To our knowledge, the database used in this paper is one of the largest and highest quality 
labour market panel in Sub-Saharan Africa (apart from being one of the few ones available). 
 
2. Econometric Approach to Measuring Informal-Formal Earnings Gaps 
 
The empirical analysis consists of assessing the magnitude of different types of informal-
formal earnings gaps using OLS and quantile regressions with log hourly earnings as 
dependent variable. Standard earnings equations are thus estimated at the mean and at 
various conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution. The models are regressed on a 
pooled sample of workers over years employed formally and informally. The different 
covariates introduced into the regressions are the completed years of education, the years of 
potential experience (with quadratic profiles for these two regressors), a dummy for being 
married, a dummy for being a woman, ten dummy variables of industries to account for 
technological differences between branches of activity, ten area dummies to capture labour 
market local specificities and four time dummies to control for macroeconomic trend effects 
on earnings.5 
A number of studies based on data on African manufacturing firms have shown that wages 
are positively correlated to firm size, conditional on standard human capital variables.6 The 
literature discusses numerous reasons why wages are positively correlated with firm size. 
One of the frequently made arguments is that firm size is correlated with omitted worker 
quality because large firms usually attract more productive workers. Thus, not accounting 
for this demand side characteristic may induce severe biases in the usual Mincerian 
equations. Fortunately in this paper, we are able to control for the size of the firms that we 
aggregated in four ordinate ranges. However, given that firm size is highly correlated with 
informal/formal status, we systematically estimate our models with and without the firm size 
in order to disentangle the effect of these two variables.  
To account for informal-formal differences in earnings at the mean earnings level, we rely 
on pooled OLS regressions across years and Fixed Effects OLS regressions (FEOLS), the 
latter accounting for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The FE model can be written 
as 
 = 
  + 	
 +  +           (1) 
where  	denotes the vector of characteristics of individual i observed at time t (which 
includes a constant term), 
 	represents a dummy taking value one if person i observed at 
time t is an informal sector worker. ∝ is the time-invariant individual heterogeneity (or the 
individual fixed effect) and   is an i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term absorbing 
measurement error. Note7 that |, 
 ,  = 0. 
The estimated coefficient 	  is interpreted as a measure of the conditional earnings 
premium/penalty experienced by workers who change status between informal sector jobs to 
formal sector employment (or the reversal). However, as mentioned previously, informal 
employment is extremely heterogeneous and a finer job divide should be considered. We 
                                                          
5
 These industry dummies include “Agriculture”, “Food processing”, “Clothing”, “Machinary”, “Other 
Manufacture”, “Construction”, “Transportation”, “Trade”, “Public services” and “Other services”. The area 
dummies consist in the ten sampled communes the survey has been drawn from. 
6  See Strobl and Thornton (2002), Manda (2002) and Söderbom, Teal and Wambugu (2005). 
7
 One could use a random effect (RE) model assuming in addition that | , 
 = 0. However, as in many 
other cases, this condition is very unlikely to be satisfied as individual unobserved characteristics are generally 
correlated with workers’ observable characteristics. Hausman's specification test indeed confirmed a 
systematic difference in the FE and RE estimators. 
then define four categories of workers split by job status (wage workers vs. self-employed 
workers) and institutional sector (formal vs. informal) and create four dummies taking value 
one if the individual i at time t is an informal wage worker (
), a formal wage worker 
(), an informal self-employed worker (
) and a formal self-employed worker (). 
Taking the formal wage workers as the reference category, the model we estimate can be 
written as  
 = 
  + 
 + 
 + + +        (2) 
The estimated coefficients	 ,  and  are interpreted, respectively, as the IW – FW, IS – FW 
and FS – FW conditional earnings gaps. Identification of these conditional earnings gaps 
relies on the presence in the sample of movers between employment states over time. Those 
movers can be compared to the stayers in terms of earnings. As an illustration, we consider a 
simple two-period example and eight cases of transitions out of the various possibilities of 
professional trajectories (which are 16 in a two-period example):  
2 cases of stayers: 
 − "|
" = 1, 
 = 1 = Δ        (3) 
 − "|
" = 1, 
 = 1 = Δ        (4) 
with Δ = (  − " ) 
6 cases of movers:  
 − "|
" = 1, 
 = 1 = Δ + θ − δ      (5) 
 − "|
" = 1,  = 1 = Δ − δ       (6) 
 − "|" = 1, 
 = 1 = Δ + θ       (7) 
 − "|" = 1,  = 1 = Δ + λ       (8) 
 − "|
" = 1,  = 1 = Δ + λ − θ      (9) 
 − "|
" = 1,  = 1 = Δ − θ       (10) 
with Δ = (  − " ) 
Equations (3) and (4) give examples of the changes in earnings for stayers, i.e. for workers 
that do not change their employment state between the two periods. Equations (5) and (6) 
illustrate the changes in earnings for those workers coming from an informal wage job and 
moving, respectively, into an informal self-employed job and a formal wage job; equations 
(7) and (8) represent these earnings differentials for those coming from a formal wage 
employment and moving, respectively, into an informal self-employed job and a formal self-
employed job. Finally, the cases of informal self-employed workers moving to, respectively, 
formal self-employed and formal wage jobs are considered in equations (9) and (10).  
The identification strategy of FE on movers is quite standard but, in practice, one should 
verify that the number of moves across employment states is sufficient for a valid use of this 
estimator. We verify that this is the case in Table 5 in the next section. More generally the 
identification strategy supposes that movers change employment states more or less 
randomly, or at least that they do not systematically move for better earnings. However, 
people may change jobs in particular if they see an opportunity to earn more. We present in 
the following section earnings matrices showing that this is actually not the case (Table 6). 
Finally, to allow the earnings gaps between job statuses to differ along the earnings 
distribution, we rely on Quantile Regressions (QR). Quantile earnings regressions consider 
specific parts of the conditional distribution of the hourly earnings and indicate the influence 
of the different explanatory variables on conditional earnings respectively at the bottom, at 
the median and at the top of the distribution. 
Using our previous notation, the model that we seek to estimate is: 
)*() = 
 (+) + (+)
 + (+)
 + (+)+, ∀+ ∈ 0,1   (11) 
where )*()  is the 	+ th conditional quantile of the log hourly earnings. The set of 
coefficients (+)	provide the estimated rates of return to the different covariates at the	+th 
quantile of the log earnings distribution and the coefficients (+), (+)	and	(+)	measure 
the parts of the earnings differentials that are due to informal-formal job differences at the 
various quantiles. In a quantile regression, the distribution of the error term is left 
unspecified. The quantile regression method provides robust estimates, particularly for 
misspecification errors related to non-normality and heteroskedasticity. 
We then turn to Fixed Effects Quantile Regressions (FEQR). The extension of the standard 
QR model to longitudinal data has been originally developed by Koenker (2004). More 
recently, Canay (2010) proposed an alternative and simpler approach which assumes that the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms have a pure location shift effect on the conditional quantiles 
of the dependent variable. In other words, they are assumed to affect all quantiles in the 
same way. It follows that these unobserved terms can be estimated in a first step by 
traditional mean estimations (for instance by FE). Then, the predicted 12  are used to correct 
earnings, such as 12 =  − 12  , which are regressed on the other regressors by traditional 
QR.  
When running the regressions (2) and (11), we always provide robust standard errors using 
bootstrap replications. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics and Validity checks 
 
Table 4 presents some basic summary statistics of the main characteristics of the panel data 
used in our analysis. These descriptive statistics are reported for the sub-samples of 
wage/self-employed workers, broken down by formal and informal sector jobs.  
The results obtained for average earnings are in line with common findings in the literature. 
Workers holding formal sector jobs earn more on average than those engaged in informal 
sector jobs. Among each group of formal and informal sector workers, self-employed 
workers are those with higher earnings in comparison with wage earners. If the average age 
of the labour force is the same between the two sectors, informal sector wage workers tend 
to be younger than their formal worker counterparts. Self-employed workers exhibit on 
average longer potential experience in the labour market (which is calculated as age minus 
years of reported schooling minus five). As expected, workers having higher level of 
education are less likely to be engaged in the informal sector and vice versa. The gender 
ratio varies significantly between formal and informal sector jobs. Female workers have 
more opportunity to get informal sector jobs, female participation is at its highest in informal 
self-employment and at its lowest in formal one.  
Finally, formal and informal sector workers are differently allocated across branches of 
activity. Specifically, informal sector employment is found more in trade, restaurants and 
construction, while formal sector jobs are more concentrated in clothing and services (in 
particular public administration). Interestingly, the share of manufacture is identical for 
informal sector jobs than for formal ones (31% in both cases). Within institutional sectors, 
the distribution is even more unbalanced: informal sector wage workers are stubbornly 
engaged in services to the person (51%), whereas informal self-employed workers hold trade 
jobs (36%). Formal sector wage workers are engaged prominently in services (63%), while 
formal self-employed job’s structure looks like the informal self-employed one. In terms of 
firm size, formal sector wage workers are as expected over-represented in large enterprises, 
while the three other groups are quasi exclusively engaged in micro-enterprises (informal 
self-employed workers operating the smallest ones). These significant differences in the 
distribution of job structure underline the importance of controlling for sectors of activity 
and size in our earnings estimations. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions  
(pooled rounds 200-2001-2002-2004) 
 Formal sector workers   Informal sector workers 
 
Wage Workers Self-employed Total Wage Workers Self-employed Total 
 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Hourly earnings (in CPI deflated Ariary) 0.025 0.031 0.055 0.117 0.027 0.041 0.011 0.012 0.019 0.041 0.017 0.037 
Years of completed schooling 10.3 4.1 11.3 4.1 10.3 4.1 6.7 3.4 7.4 3.7 7.3 3.7 
Potential Experience 22.8 11.2 25.3 11.9 23.0 11.2 24.1 12.5 26.8 12.8 26.2 12.8 
Age 38.1 11.02 41.6 11.0 38.3 11.0 35.9 11.8 39.2 11.9 38.5 12.0 
Female 0.408 0.491 0.299 0.459 0.402 0.490 0.476 0.500 0.503 0.500 0.497 0.500 
Married 0.689 0.463 0.768 0.423 0.693 0.461 0.554 0.497 0.712 0.453 0.678 0.467 
Branch of activity             
Agriculture 0.007 0.081 0.013 0.115 0.007 0.083 0.013 0.113 0.075 0.263 0.062 0.240 
Food processing 0.025 0.156 0.005 0.073 0.024 0.153 0.021 0.145 0.024 0.152 0.023 0.150 
Clothing 0.193 0.395 0.027 0.162 0.185 0.388 0.081 0.273 0.139 0.346 0.126 0.332 
Machinery 0.013 0.112 0.003 0.052 0.012 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.011 
Other manufacturing 0.093 0.290 0.116 0.321 0.094 0.292 0.098 0.298 0.098 0.298 0.098 0.298 
Construction 0.036 0.187 0.081 0.273 0.038 0.192 0.102 0.303 0.066 0.249 0.074 0.262 
Transportation 0.075 0.263 0.124 0.330 0.077 0.267 0.062 0.241 0.049 0.216 0.052 0.221 
Trade 0.089 0.285 0.394 0.489 0.105 0.306 0.112 0.316 0.356 0.479 0.303 0.460 
Public administration 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.351 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.022 
Other services 0.318 0.466 0.237 0.426 0.314 0.464 0.509 0.500 0.192 0.394 0.261 0.439 
Size of the firm             
1 to 10 employees 0.158 0.365 0.876 0.330 0.194 0.396 0.859 0.348 0.993 0.083 0.964 0.186 
11 to 100 employees 0.306 0.461 0.124 0.330 0.297 0.457 0.141 0.348 0.007 0.083 0.036 0.186 
101 to 500 employees 0.155 0.362 0.000 0.000 0.147 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
More than 500 employees 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.361 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year dummies             
2000 0.250 0.433 0.186 0.390 0.246 0.431 0.235 0.424 0.237 0.426 0.237 0.425 
2001 0.303 0.460 0.235 0.424 0.300 0.458 0.277 0.448 0.267 0.442 0.269 0.444 
2002 0.237 0.426 0.399 0.490 0.246 0.430 0.283 0.451 0.268 0.443 0.272 0.445 
2004 0.210 0.407 0.181 0.385 0.208 0.406 0.204 0.403 0.227 0.419 0.222 0.416 
             
Observations  7007 371 7378 1781 6397 8178 
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
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Table 5 reports the job transition matrices by institutional sector and status in employment  
between 2000 and 2004. All individuals aged 18 years and over are included and split in 
four groups: formal sector wage workers, informal sector wage workers, self-employed 
workers and non-working population. To save space and given the small number of 
observations, formal self-employed workers have been aggregated with informal ones (we 
will distinguish them in our estimations; see Section 5). Inactive and unemployed are also 
aggregated into one broad category. First, the proportion of movers (from one category to 
another) is far from negligible and is quite stable over time. From one year to the next, 
movers represent around one third of the three samples (from a minimum of 31% between 
2000 and 2001 to a maximum of 36% between 2002 and 2004). If we consider only those 
holding a job, the target of our earnings gap estimations, the rate of mover reduced to one 
fourth (22% to 26% respectively for the same periods). Formal sector wage jobs are the 
most stable, followed by self-employment ones. Informal sector wage workers are the most 
mobile: only 30% keep their status from one year to the other. The flows between sectors 
follow a consistent pattern. Informal sector wage worker movers mainly get formal sector 
wage and (informal) self-employed jobs, equally distributed. Formal sector wage worker 
movers privilege self-employment, but substantial flows go to informal sector wage jobs. 
Conversely, self-employed workers change more often for formal sector wage jobs than for 
informal ones, withdrawing from occupation being their first option (retirement).  
Another striking evidence is the surprising weak impact of the macroeconomic context on 
transition flows. Changes in year-to-year transition flows (direction and intensity) are 
limited, stressing a robust structural pattern. This assessment is confirmed by the long run 
transition matrix, as shown in the low right panel of Table 5. The 2000-2004 matrix is very 
similar to the short run matrices. At our four states level, 61% of the sample are stayers, 
compared to 64-69% in the year to year matrices (73% and 74-79% respectively for those 
who kept a job).  For each of the four initial position, the distribution of movers between 
categories are surprisingly close to the year-to-year one. However, at the margins, the crisis 
spell (between 2001 and 2002) shows a significantly lower rate of formal sector wage 
worker stayers, while the transitions from the informal sector jobs to formal sector ones 
decline. Bad conditions on the labour market also affect transitions between working and 
non-working position: in time of crisis, all kind of workers more often become unemployed 
or inactive than during the growth periods. On the methodological side, the substantial 
numbers of movers, in both directions, and for all types of jobs, is key for our estimation 
strategy. 






Table 5. Transition matrices of employment status between 2000 and 2004 (%) 
 2001     2002 















             
Not Working 72.2 9.6 4.6 13.6 100.00  Not Working 71.2 8.5 3.5 16.8 100.00 
Formal Sector Wage Worker 8.6 79.0 5.4 7.0 100.00  Formal Sector Wage Worker 14.7 65.0 7.3 13.0 100.00 
Informal Sector Wage Worker 15.1 26.0 30.2 28.7 100.00  Informal Sector Wage Worker 18.5 18.8 33.8 28.9 100.00 
Self-employed Worker 16.6 10.0 7.7 65.7 100.00  Self-employed Worker 19.7 7.1 7.0 66.2 100.00 
Total 32.9 32.1 7.6 27.4 100.00  Total 35.2 26.5 7.9 30.4 100.00 
             
Observations  5,883   5,608 
 2004   2004 















             
Not Working 64.4 14.3 3.6 17.7 100.00  Not Working 60.1 13.9 4.9 21.2 100.00 
Formal Sector Wage Worker 9.4 73.9 6.5 10.2 100.00  Formal Sector Wage Worker 13.2 67.2 6.7 12.9 100.00 
Informal Sector Wage Worker 16.9 24.6 30.0 28.5 100.00  Informal Sector Wage Worker 17.5 21.3 27.6 33.6 100.00 
Self-employed Worker 16.0 11.4 7.5 65.1 100.00  Self-employed Worker 18.2 11.1 6.8 63.9 100.00 
Total 30.9 29.8 7.8 31.5 100.00  Total 29.7 29.7 7.6 33.0 100.00 
             
Observations  4,951   3,503 




To end this section on descriptive analysis, we turn to the earnings dynamics by institutional 
sector and status in employment. Table 6 present the levels (in constant 2000 Ariary) and the 
changes (in %) in real earnings for the three year-to-year periods and the "long run" spell 
(2000-2004). Compared to Table 5, the panel sample is restricted to the individuals holding 
a job and having positive earnings in both period. Consequently, those who are not working 
or unpaid family workers are excluded. The number of observations is around 3,000 for 
year-to-year matrices and 2,000 for the 2000-2004 matrix.  
The left panel of Table 6 shows the level of real hourly earnings in the final date by 
transition status. Consistently with Table 4, informal sector wage workers get the lowest 
pay, followed by informal self-employed, formal sector wage workers and the formal self-
employed workers at the highest end of the earnings ladder. If we now take into account 
transition status, informal sector wage worker stayers systematically perceive less than those 
who changed to self-employment or formal sector wage jobs. Symmetrically, self-employed 
stayers get a better remuneration than those who move to formal or informal sector wage 
jobs, with the exception of the 2001-2002 period. Such exception can be due to a crisis 
effect (shrink in demand and increased competition), while formal sector wages are more 
rigid. Finally, formal sector wage worker stayers, as primary labour market insiders, are by 
far the best compensated workers (compared with the other eight transition status); the only 
exceptions are formal self-employed workers. This result suggests that, in average, creating 
an informal firm from a formal sector wage job induces a decline in earnings. Two potential 
reasons may be invocated: some have been constraint to settle an informal business because 
of lay-off in formal or institutional factors (like retirement age); non-pecuniary 
considerations may be at stake, but a lower pay than those who obtained a formal sector 
wage job.    
These unconditional earnings in the end year do not tell much on earning dynamics, initial 
conditions being only taken into account through the labour status in the base year. 
Considering growth rates is a first step to control for initial earnings (right panel of Table 6). 
Moving to informal sector wage jobs is associated with the lowest increase in earnings over 
all periods, whereas being able to change to a formal self-employed job is associated with 
the highest earnings growth. Moving out of informal sector wage job ensures higher 
earnings growth rates, while abandoning self-employment for wage jobs, or formal to 
informal wage jobs provides lower growth rates. In terms of earnings growth, the picture for 
those who quit a formal sector wage job to create an informal business is mixed: in two 
cases out of four they perform better than their stayers counterparts (2000-2001 and 2001-
2002), but do worse in the two other cases (2002-2004 and 2000-2004). This suggests a 
potential trade-off between these two kind of jobs, a stylized feature underlined in the 




Table 6. Earnings dynamics by employment status between 2000 and 2004 
 
Real hourly earnings in 2001 
  


















Formal Sector Wage Worker 2,685 1,236 2,520 2,587  Formal Sector Wage Worker 3.6% 0.7% 13.0% 4.2% 
Informal Sector Wage Worker 1,746 0,772 1,237 1,225  Informal Sector Wage Worker 11.5% 9.5% 34.4% 17.9% 
Self-employed Worker 1,862 1,089 2,194 2,052  Self-employed Worker -12.0% -17.9% 10.8% 6.0% 
Total 2,541 1,009 2,133 2,217  Total 2.6% -5.3% 12.2% 5.6% 
           
 Real hourly earnings in 2002   Real hourly earnings growth 2001-2002 
 2002    2002  













Formal Sector Wage Worker 2,875 1,416 1,912 2,604  Formal Sector Wage Worker 3.0% -13.0% 8.1% 2.7% 
Informal Sector Wage Worker 1,722 0,853 1,443 1,264  Informal Sector Wage Worker 15.5% 1.9% 55.5% 23.8% 
Self-employed Worker 2,112 0,981 2,016 1,935  Self-employed Worker -8.3% -26.7% -1.8% -3.9% 
Total 2,745 1,083 1,951 2,187  Total 2.6% -13.7% 2.0% 1.2% 
 
    
 Real hourly earnings in 2004   Real hourly earnings growth 2002-2004* 
 2004    2004  













Formal Sector Wage Worker 2,934 1,555 2,146 2,748  Formal Sector Wage Worker 2.3% -7.6% -0.1% 1.6% 
Informal Sector Wage Worker 1,718 0,967 1,556 1,390  Informal Sector Wage Worker 9.7% 5.4% 19.5% 11.9% 
Self-employed Worker 1,672 1,148 1,993 1,874  Self-employed Worker -10.4% -13.9% -0.9% -3.1% 
Total 2,656 1,186 1,969 2,180  Total 1.3% -6.7% 0.3% 0.3% 
 Real hourly earnings in 2004   Real hourly earnings growth 2000-2004* 
 2004    2004  













Formal Sector Wage Worker 2,833 1,448 1,997 2,601  Formal Sector Wage Worker 1.8% -0.8% 0.5% 1.5% 
Informal Sector Wage Worker 1,761 0,900 1,604 1,408  Informal Sector Wage Worker 8.2% 2.4% 13.4% 8.9% 
Self-employed Worker 1,842 1,199 2,166 2,043  Self-employed Worker -0.7% -1.0% 4.0% 3.1% 
Total 2,629 1,178 2,087 2,225  Total 1.8% -0.1% 4.0% 2.6% 
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. *: for comparability sake, 2002/04 and 2000/04 are computed in annual average growth rates. 
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Of course, these unconditional averages should be controlled for observed and unobserved 
characteristics, which is the purpose of the following sections. Furthermore, changes in job 
states are not systematically associated with upwards (or downwards) trends in incomes. 
Among our 24 groups of movers, 13 of them suffered a lower income growth than their 
respective stayers, while 11 benefited from a relative increase. This reinforces the 
identification strategy of earnings gaps based on movers and stayers (see previous section). 
Finally, our analysis shows that earnings levels and changes are highly dependent on 
transitions. Transition and earnings matrices are very consistent, confirming the high quality 
of our data, a feature already stressed in previous methodological papers (Roubaud, 2000; 
Rakotomanana, 2011). The panel structure fits accurately with our identification strategy to 
answer the main research question of this paper. 
 
5. Earnings Gaps Analysis 
 
In this section we discuss the earning gaps between formal and informal sector jobs at the 
aggregate level, estimated using the four estimations procedures presented in Section 3. As 
discussed earlier, the informal sector is immensely heterogeneous. The theoretical literature, 
as our own empirical evidence, suggests that a key divide should be considered within the 
informal jobs, between wage workers and self-employed. If the point is now well established 
in the literature, formal sector job heterogeneity is rarely acknowledged. So we distinguish 
between four groups of workers, split by job status (wage workers vs. self-employed) and 
institutional sector (formal vs. informal). In the following discussion, we compare the three 
other work status with formal wage workers, as our benchmark. We also investigate the 
gender issue. 
Formal vs. informal sector workers 
At the aggregate level, not considering firm size, the OLS estimate of the informal sector 
employment earnings gap is a rather huge -20%.8 Taking into account the (time invariant) 
unobserved individual characteristics (UICs) through fixed effect OLS estimation (FEOLS) 
reduces the earnings penalty significantly, down to -10%. Thus, nearly half of the gap can be 
explained by unobserved characteristics, the most productive workers privileging the formal 
sector. As always, this standard feature does not tell us much about what specific factors are 
really at play. On the one hand, the innate ability or the “talent parabola” is commonly 
stressed in the literature. On the other hand, many other explanations can be put forward. 
For instance, UICs may have to do with more efficient social networks to get a formal sector 
job. However, the remaining -10% gap, once we control for UICs, highlights that formal 
sector jobs provide higher earnings per se. Here again, this result can be due to various 
                                                          
8
 Models without firm size are not reported. They are available from the authors upon request. 
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factors which end up, at the firm level, in a higher productivity or market power, and/or, at 
the worker level, in a stronger bargaining power of formal workers to negotiate higher 
earnings.   
To go beyond average, we ran quantile regressions. While informal sector workers suffer 
earnings penalties at almost all levels of the conditional distribution, the gap is sharply 
decreasing from the bottom to the upper part. Beginning with a huge -38% (quantile .10), 
the gap continuously shrinks to become insignificant around quantile .80. From then, it even 
reverts to reach +7% at the upper-tier of the distribution (quantile .90). The Fixed Effects 
Quantile Regression (FEQR) gap not only confirms both the key role of UICs in reducing 
the “true” gap but also the pattern along the earnings distribution: from -28% for the bottom 
quantile (quantile .10) to 14% for the upper one (quantile .90).  
However, once we control for the size of the enterprises, the average earnings gap nearly 
disappears. The OLS gap is only -6.3% (Figure 1A and Table A1), while the FEOLS is 
slightly negative but non-significant. Interestingly, the profiles of the earnings gap along the 
distribution remain unchanged, with a systematic penalty decline for informal sector 
workers from the lower to the upper tier (QR, Figure 1A and Tables A4 and A5). The QR 
estimates range from  a -23% penalty for informal sector workers at the bottom (q.10) to a 
11% bonus at the top (q.90), while the respective numbers are -13% and 10% for FEQR, the 
turning point (from penalty to bonus) being around the third quartile in both cases. 
The interpretation of the size effect is not straightforward in our informal vs. formal 
perspective. First, conditional earnings grow with the size of the enterprise, as shown in 
Table A1. This result is robust to any of our specification and consistent with the literature 
in this respect. Second, as the informal sector is often defined as enterprises under a certain 
size threshold (minus 5 or 10 workers), introducing the size in our estimation as an 
independent variable tends to absorb the impact of informality on earnings. This is all the 
more the case that the two criteria used to identify the informal sector (size and registration) 
are highly correlated. In the remainder of this paper we still decide to comment the earnings 
gaps based on the regression including the size as an independent variable. As a 
consequence, two important points should be kept in mind: our results focus on the impact 
of non-registration on earnings, net from the size effect; the exhibited gaps should be 
interpreted as the most conservative estimates, which are systematically higher without 
control for the firm size.  
Finally, whatever the earnings equation specification (with or without size), the huge gap 
variations along the distribution point to the intrinsic informal sector heterogeneity. This 
result is mainly due to the fact that the “dualistic assumption” is too rough, gathering 
together very diverse categories of workers within each sector, which we investigate below 




Formal vs. informal wage workers 
As expected, within wage workers, those employed in the informal sector are on average 
worse-off than their formal sector counterparts (Figure 1B and Table A1, column (3)). The 
OLS gap (-17%) is significantly reduced to -9% when individual fixed effects are 
introduced, suggesting that informal wage workers may have a disadvantage in terms of 
their unobserved productive attributes. Taking or not taking into account the fixed effects, 
the gap is continuously decreasing (Figure 1B and Tables A4 and A5): from -30% (quantile 
.10) to -5% (quantile .90; non-significant) for the latter, and from -16% to 1% (non-
significant) respectively, when controlling for UICs. In both cases, formal sector wage 
workers conserve an earnings advantage at any position in the pay ladder. Even if we cannot 
exclude that non-pecuniary disadvantages of formal wage jobs may be compensated by 
earnings (such as poor working conditions),9 these results could be taken as an acceptable 
validation of the exclusion hypothesis (for this category of workers), according to which 
informal wage workers are constraint in their job choice, and are probably queuing for 
formal jobs. 
Formal wage vs. informal self-employed workers 
For the bulk of the labour force, this alternative choice is probably the main trade-off, and 
also the most discussed in the literature. At odd with the previous case considered and more 
generally the dualistic approach, the conditional OLS gap is positive, with a significant 
premium of +20% for the informal self-employed (Figure 1C and Table A1, column (3)). 
Furthermore, the FEOLS models increase the premium further to +12% (column (5)). Again, 
this would mean that informal self-employed workers have an advantage in terms of their 
unobserved productive characteristics (probably in terms of their entrepreneurial skills), 
which produces an overestimation of the premium associated with being an informal self-
employed worker compared to exerting as a formal wage worker if this individual 
heterogeneity is not accounted for. We nevertheless should be cautious before claiming that 
the exit option may be at stake, as the self-employed earnings may be overestimated for at 
least two reasons: first, the measure of earnings we computed remunerates both labour and 
capital factors (mixed income), the latter being far from negligible in the informal sector 
(Vaillant et al., 2011); second, the self-employed earnings include the share which should be 
attributed to the productive contribution of unpaid family workers. As we do not have any 
order of magnitude of these two phenomena, it is difficult to exclude the possibility that the 
premium we obtain may not turn into a penalty, once these two factors are taken into 
account.10  
                                                          
9
 For a detailed analysis of the possible existing pecuniary compensations for working conditions along the 
earnings distribution, see Fernández and Nordman (2009) in the case of UK. 
10
 The definitive assessment is even more complex as measurement errors in incomes are usually considered as 
more important for self-employed than for wage workers, as the former usually do not know their precise level 
of income (especially informal self account workers who do not have book accounts), and the richest ones tend 
to understate their level of activity.  
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When turning to quantile regressions (Figure 1C and Tables A4 and A5), the distributional 
profile of the gap presents the same now clear pattern, as in the two previous cases. The gap 
steeply increases with earnings level, and is in favour of the informal self-employed 
workers. In absolute terms, informal self-employed labourers suffer a penalty only at the 
lowest end of the conditional distribution (up to about the first quartile where the gap is not 
significant). Afterwards, the gap is reversed into a significant premium, growing 
continuously up to 60% for the richest decile (quantile .90), crossing the OLS estimate at the 
median point of the earnings distribution. FEQR confirm this trend, the only difference 
being that the range of variation of the gap along the distribution is attenuated. Once the 
UICs are controlled for, informal self-employed workers are better-off at all points of the 
pay scale above the first quartile up to 39% at quantile .90. All in all, and given the size of 
the premium, we can confidently conclude that informal self-employment may be more 
lucrative that formal wage alternatives, especially for the richest workers. As a matter of 
consequence, we have good presumptions to assert that, in Madagascar, a substantial part of 
the labour force has deliberately chosen to work in the informal sector as non-wage workers, 
for pecuniary reasons. 
Formal wage vs. formal self-employed workers 
The earnings comparison of formal wage workers and formal self-employed workers is 
clearly in favour of the latter, whatever the model chosen (Figure 1D and Tables A1, 
columns (3) and (5)). The OLS estimate presents a +93% premium, just slightly reduced 
with fixed effects (+30%). As with the informal self-employed workers, their unobserved 
productive attributes may be better than those of the formal wage workers. As in the case of 
informal self-employed workers, the premium is continuously increasing with earnings 
levels, but is translated upwards, a pattern in line with the empirical results obtained in the 
literature for developed countries. Controlling for UICs or not, formal self-employed 
workers are always better-off in terms of earnings than formal sector wage workers, the 
premium culminating at +149% (QR) and +69% (FEQR). Overall, it seems that the 
Malagasy labour market functions under a regime of wage repression. Whatever the reasons 
- macro pressures of international integration, deliberate policies to control inflation, or 
weak bargaining power of the wage workers; the latter being the most plausible -, it seems 
globally preferable to work as an independent (even in the informal sector) than as a wage 
worker (at least in non-farm activities). 
Formal vs. informal self-employed workers 
Lastly, we turn to the comparison between the two kinds of self-employed workers: formal 
and informal. Formal self-employed workers are rarely considered in the literature on LDCs, 
maybe because they are too few in the countries considered. But there are many reasons to 
focus on this category of workers: first, to compare our results with those obtained in 
developed countries on salaried vs. non-salaried workers’ earnings gap, as in these countries 
self-employed workers are quasi-exclusively formal; second, because it allows us to 
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establish the link with the existing formal/informal sector literature from a business 
perspective (not job). Finally, the comparison appears more legitimate as the nature of 
incomes and unobservables potentially at play are in both cases equivalent (which is not true 
concerning wage workers).  
Formal self-employed workers are systematically in a better position than their informal 
counterparts, all along the pay scale (Figure 1E; the reference group is now informal self-
employed workers; regressions tables are not reported to save space). Returns to firm’s 
formalization is always positive and increasing with the net earnings, even when controlling 
for entrepreneurial skills and other unobserved characteristics, the most favoured in this 
respect choosing disproportionately the formal sector. This advantage of formal household 
businesses may be due to higher initial level of physical capital or more productive 
combination of factors (our models do not provide elements on this point), but it is 
compatible with the potential causal benefits of getting formal (access to credit and markets) 
as found in the literature. 
 
A gender perspective 
Exploring the gender dimension associated with informality is crucial for various reasons. 
First, there is strong imbalances in the job structure, female being more prone to hold 
informal sector jobs than their male counterparts. Second, the raw gender earnings gap is in 
general significantly higher in the informal sector.11  Finally, and more importantly, the 
motivation to hold informal sector jobs is highly dependent on gender. Women may have a 
welfare function which is less dependent on income incentives, as they take more care of 
extra professional activities (as family life, children care, social relations, etc.), where 
informal sector jobs could be a more satisfying option. Without going into details, we 
highlight the main findings displayed in Figures 2 and Figures 3 and their corresponding 
regression tables reported in Tables A2, A3 and A6 to A9.   
Firstly, whatever the models’ specifications and the category of workers considered, females 
always financially suffer more (or benefit less) when they are employed in the informal 
sector. For instance, at the aggregate informal vs. informal level (Figures 2A and 3A), the 
OLS gap is slightly (but not significant) for men while reaching -18% for women; the 
FEOLS being respectively 1% (non-significant) and -7% (significant at the 10% level). Such 
a feature is compatible with the idea mentioned above, that women may accept lower wages 
in the informal sector because it provides other non-pecuniary advantages, relatively more 
valuable to them. However, it can also reveal barriers or labour market segmentation, which 
would be more pronounced for women competing for formal sector jobs.  
                                                          
11
 For Africa, see Nordman, Robilliard and Roubaud (2011) for estimates of the gender earnings gap in the 
formal and informal sectors of different West African capital cities using household surveys, Nordman and 
Wolff (2010) for formal sector gender earnings gaps using matched worker-firm datasets for seven African 




Quantile regressions shed an interesting light on the informal vs. formal earnings gap by 
gender. For men, working in the informal sector is financially penalizing below the median 
of the distribution and advantageous afterwards, whether taking UICs into account of not. 
For women, holding an informal sector job is always associated with lower conditional 
earnings, or at best equivalent to being employed in the formal sector (for the last quartile of 
earnings). By contrast, while the penalty for being informal sector wage workers remains 
substantial for women once UICs are controlled for (-18%, Figure 3B and column (5) of 
Table A3), it is no more significant for men. For the latter, working informally is at least 
financially as rewarding as having a formal job, whether dependent (Figure 3B) or 
independent (Figure 3C).  
Secondly, in spite of differences in absolute levels, the distributional profile of the earnings 
gaps is quite similar across gender: no noticeable effect for formal self-employed workers 
compared to informal ones, an increasing slope for the other categories respect to formal 
sector wage workers. The only exception is for informal sector wage workers, which 
earnings are globally as rewarding as those obtained by formal sector wage workers for men, 
while the penalty suffered by female informal sector wage workers is continuously and 
steeply decreasing, but never turns into a premium.  
Thirdly, the sorting process in the allocation of men and women across employment status 
(which is partly revealed by the effect of controlling for UICs) does not differ substantially 
across gender: informal wage workers have detrimental UICs (in order to get a better 
income) vis-à-vis formal wage workers, while the unobserved skills are favourable for self-
employed workers (whether formal or informal). The only exception is for male wage 




(preliminary, to complete) 
 
Our paper focuses on formal/informal earnings gap in Madagascar, in order to shed light on 
two alternative views as regard informality: the exclusion hypothesis vs. the exit hypothesis. 
Taking advantage of the rich 1-2-3 Surveys for Madagascar, the four wave panel data (2000-
2001-2002-2004) give us the unique opportunity to control for time-invariant unobserved 
individual characteristics. Using both standard and fixed effects earnings equations 
estimated at the mean and at various conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution, we 
address the key issue of heterogeneity, at three different levels: the worker level, taking into 
account individual unobserved characteristics; the job level, comparing wage workers with 
self-employed workers; the distributional level. Gender issues are also examined. To our 
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knowledge, this approach is applied for the first time ever in Madagascar, and rarely for 
Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Our results suggest that the informal earnings gap highly depends on the workers’ job status 
(wage employment vs. self-employment) and on their relative position in the earnings 
distribution. Our main conclusions are often at odds with the exclusion hypothesis and what 
would show the observed raw earnings gaps: in many cases, informal jobs are more 
rewarding (self-employment) or as rewarding (male wage workers) as formal wage jobs. 
This feature is due to the relatively low wages of formal wage jobs. The reason for such a 
specificity should be investigated further (international competition pressure? wage 
repression policy?). Second, Madagascar’s labour market seems more integrated than what 
its development level would have predicted. The earnings gaps look more like those 
observed in emerging countries, characterized by a weak segmentation between formal and 
informal jobs, than the standard dualistic Sub-Saharan labour markets. Third, the systematic 
premium at all points of the distribution of formal self-employed workers over their informal 
counterparts suggests that formalization of non-farm household businesses seems to be 
beneficial. Policies aiming at easing administrative procedures to register informal firms 
should be encouraged. Finally, females always financially suffer more (or benefit less) when 
they are informally employed. This feature opens space for specific policies to align the 
functioning of labour market for women with that of men (reduction in entry barriers to 
formal jobs, improvement of access to physical capital, etc.). 
Our paper raises further promising prospects, and could be extended in various directions. A 
first extension would be to better control for individual unobserved characteristics, by 
purging our earning estimations of differences in the amount of physical capital (for self-
employed workers) and social networks. A firm based panel approach may be an interesting 
alternative entry in this respect. Another potential extension would be to exploit further the 
nature of our data (four point panel) by estimating dynamic earnings equations. Lastly, our 
work could be usefully complemented by investigating the determinants of job satisfaction, 
to enlarge the perspective which relies exclusively on earnings outputs and to check the 
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Figures 1. Estimated Earnings Gaps for Full Sample of Men and Women 
  (with reference to formal sector wage workers) 
 
Note: Fixed Effects (FE) OLS are denoted by FEOLS and Fixed Effects Quantile Regressions (QR) by FEQR. 
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are represented by the grey surface for QR and by dashed lines for the 
OLS. 
 










































































































































































































































































































































Figures 2. Estimated Earnings Gaps for Women and Men Separately by OLS and QR 
(with reference to formal sector wage workers) 
 
Note: Fixed Effects (FE) OLS are denoted by FEOLS. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are represented 
by the grey surface for QR and by dashed lines for the OLS. 
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figures 3. Estimated Earnings Gaps for Women and Men Separately  
by FEOLS and FEQR 
(with reference to formal sector wage workers) 
 
Note: Fixed Effects (FE) OLS are denoted by FEOLS. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are represented 
by the grey surface for QR and by dashed lines for the OLS. 
 
3.A Informal Sector Worker - Formal Sector Worker Earnings Gap – FEOLS FEQR 
 
 























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1. Mean Earnings Regressions For All Workers  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
Madagascar 2000-2001-2002-2004 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
 
     
Informal Sector Worker  -0.065***  -0.034  
  (0.020)  (0.024)  
Informal Self-Emp. Worker   0.184***  0.113*** 
   (0.022)  (0.030) 
Informal sector Wage Worker   -0.184***  -0.094*** 
   (0.023)  (0.027) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker   0.657***  0.262*** 
   (0.048)  (0.059) 
Years of schooling 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.020 0.021 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017) 
Years of schooling squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential experience 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) 
Potential experience squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.155***   
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)   
Married 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.077*** 0.009 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.029) (0.029) 
Size of the firm (11-100 employees) 0.214*** 0.170*** 0.332*** 0.110*** 0.179*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) 
Size of the firm (101-500 employees) 0.291*** 0.237*** 0.407*** 0.188*** 0.263*** 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) 
Size of the firm (500+ employees) 0.328*** 0.274*** 0.440*** 0.188*** 0.267*** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.037) 
Year dummy 2001 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Year dummy 2002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 0.018 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) 
Year dummy 2004 -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.072*** 0.036 0.032 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.039) (0.039) 
      
      
Constant -5.656*** -5.589*** -5.725*** -5.071*** -5.197*** 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.056) (0.324) (0.326) 
      
Observations 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 
R-squared 0.353 0.354 0.375 0.012 0.020 
Number of individuals    6069 6069 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  







Table A2. Mean Earnings Regressions for Men  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
Madagascar 2000-2001-2002-2004 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
 
     
Informal Sector Worker  0.027  -0.010  
  (0.025)  (0.029)  
Informal Self-Emp. Worker   0.289***  0.146*** 
   (0.028)  (0.037) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker   -0.060**  -0.040 
   (0.028)  (0.033) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker   0.734***  0.326*** 
   (0.058)  (0.073) 
Years of schooling 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.031 0.033 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.022) 
Years of schooling squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential experience 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) 
Potential experience squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.013 0.013 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) (0.038) 
Size of the firm (11-100 employees) 0.143*** 0.160*** 0.339*** 0.119*** 0.191*** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.033) 
Size of the firm (101-500 employees) 0.228*** 0.249*** 0.440*** 0.187*** 0.266*** 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.045) 
Size of the firm (500+ employees) 0.212*** 0.232*** 0.422*** 0.185*** 0.266*** 
 (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.047) (0.048) 
Year dummy 2001 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.028 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Year dummy 2002 -0.018 -0.018 -0.026 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
Year dummy 2004 -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.089*** 0.012 0.008 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.049) (0.049) 
      
      
Constant -5.584*** -5.612*** -5.771*** -5.158*** -5.289*** 
 (0.068) (0.072) (0.071) (0.403) (0.402) 
      
Observations 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 
R-squared 0.331 0.331 0.358 0.015 0.024 
Number of idind    3101 3101 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  









Table A3. Mean Earnings Regressions for Women  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
Madagascar 2000-2001-2002-2004 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
 
     
Informal Sector Worker  -0.197***  -0.075*  
  (0.034)  (0.044)  
Informal Self-Emp. Worker   0.045  0.054 
   (0.036)  (0.053) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker   -0.356***  -0.186*** 
   (0.038)  (0.048) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker   0.533***  0.110 
   (0.083)  (0.102) 
Years of schooling 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.007 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.028) 
Years of schooling squared 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential experience 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.028 0.028 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.023) 
Potential experience squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.040** 0.008 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.045) (0.044) 
Size of the firm (11-100 employees) 0.310*** 0.174*** 0.315*** 0.084* 0.149*** 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.045) 
Size of the firm (101-500 employees) 0.341*** 0.170*** 0.320*** 0.178*** 0.241*** 
 (0.029) (0.040) (0.040) (0.057) (0.059) 
Size of the firm (500+ employees) 0.421*** 0.251*** 0.395*** 0.186*** 0.254*** 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.059) 
Year dummy 2001 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.009 0.010 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Year dummy 2002 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.043 0.043 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.041) (0.041) 
Year dummy 2004 -0.052* -0.047* -0.052* 0.071 0.067 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.067) (0.067) 
      
      
Constant -5.836*** -5.627*** -5.743*** -4.809*** -4.882*** 
 (0.080) (0.088) (0.088) (0.563) (0.566) 
      
Observations 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 
R-squared 0.348 0.351 0.368 0.018 0.026 
Number of individuals    2968 2968 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The regressions also include nine commune dummies and nine branch activity dummies.  
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Table A4. Pooled Quantile Earnings Regressions For All Workers 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Pooled 
.10 
Pooled .25 Pooled .50 Pooled .75 Pooled .90 Pooled .10 Pooled .25 Pooled .50 Pooled .75 Pooled .90 
           
Informal Sector Worker -0.258*** -0.148*** -0.046** 0.034 0.101*      
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.019) (0.027) (0.053)      
Informal Self-Emp. Worker      -0.084* 0.045 0.161*** 0.312*** 0.472*** 
      (0.045) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.045) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker      -0.358*** -0.258*** -0.152*** -0.097*** -0.056 
      (0.041) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.052) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.411*** 0.479*** 0.655*** 0.780*** 0.912*** 
      (0.081) (0.060) (0.053) (0.068) (0.119) 
Years of schooling 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.054*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Years of schooling squared 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Potential experience 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Potential experience squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.162*** -0.133*** -0.113*** -0.105*** -0.120*** -0.177*** -0.140*** -0.127*** -0.116*** -0.116*** 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) 
Married 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.097*** 0.077*** 0.052** 0.099*** 0.094*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.037 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.023) 
Size of the firm (11-100 employees) 0.277*** 0.212*** 0.184*** 0.087*** 0.008 0.363*** 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.268*** 0.263*** 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.019) (0.026) (0.055) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.050) 
Size of the firm (101-500 employees) 0.418*** 0.316*** 0.253*** 0.139*** 0.030 0.511*** 0.422*** 0.375*** 0.325*** 0.313*** 
 (0.045) (0.029) (0.026) (0.036) (0.061) (0.052) (0.031) (0.026) (0.033) (0.052) 
Size of the firm (500+ employees) 0.446*** 0.341*** 0.303*** 0.194*** 0.065 0.539*** 0.455*** 0.438*** 0.383*** 0.349*** 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.025) (0.032) (0.055) (0.047) (0.034) (0.028) (0.030) (0.048) 
Year dummy 2001 -0.013 -0.001 0.023 0.038* 0.055** 0.006 0.011 0.020 0.057*** 0.035 
 (0.029) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) 
Year dummy 2002 -0.002 -0.028 -0.026 -0.018 -0.040 0.012 -0.022 -0.030 0.001 -0.050 
 (0.031) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.036) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.032) 
Year dummy 2004 -0.043 -0.071*** -0.090*** -0.074*** -0.098*** -0.024 -0.064*** -0.080*** -0.055*** -0.111*** 
 (0.030) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.029) 
           
           
Constant -6.468*** -5.911*** -5.463*** -5.121*** -4.886*** -6.597*** -6.042*** -5.575*** -5.277*** -5.039*** 
40 
 
 (0.128) (0.066) (0.049) (0.064) (0.116) (0.128) (0.074) (0.055) (0.061) (0.085) 
           
Observations 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 



























Table A5. Fixed Effects Quantile Earnings Regressions For All Workers 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES FE .10 FE .25 FE .50 FE .75 FE .90 FE .10 FE .25 FE .50 FE .75 FE .90 
           
Informal Sector Worker -0.138*** -0.099*** -0.034*** 0.032* 0.096***      
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.001) (0.018) (0.024)      
Informal Self-Emp. Worker      -0.074** 0.006 0.113*** 0.204*** 0.330*** 
      (0.032) (0.020) (0.001) (0.020) (0.028) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker      -0.172*** -0.140*** -0.094*** -0.044** 0.014 
      (0.029) (0.020) (0.001) (0.022) (0.029) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.009 0.115*** 0.262*** 0.395*** 0.526*** 
      (0.053) (0.042) (0.018) (0.053) (0.058) 
Years of schooling 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.002 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.008) 
Years of schooling squared -0.001* -0.000* -0.000* 0.000** 0.001*** -0.001* -0.001** -0.000*** 0.000** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Potential experience 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Potential experience squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.005 0.016 0.000 -0.014 -0.023 0.004 0.019* 0.000 -0.018 -0.028* 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.001) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012) (0.015) 
Married 0.011 0.009 0.009*** -0.004 0.004 0.014 0.011 0.011*** 0.004 0.008 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.000) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.017) 
Size of the firm (11-100 employees) 0.242*** 0.160*** 0.110*** 0.063*** -0.013 0.250*** 0.196*** 0.179*** 0.142*** 0.117*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.001) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029) (0.016) (0.001) (0.019) (0.024) 
Size of the firm (101-500 employees) 0.345*** 0.236*** 0.188*** 0.119*** 0.046 0.352*** 0.270*** 0.263*** 0.199*** 0.182*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.003) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033) (0.020) (0.004) (0.025) (0.032) 
Size of the firm (500+ employees) 0.358*** 0.243*** 0.188*** 0.131*** 0.040 0.366*** 0.283*** 0.267*** 0.224*** 0.178*** 
 (0.031) (0.024) (0.002) (0.020) (0.029) (0.032) (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.028) 
Year dummy 2001 0.030 0.022* 0.020*** 0.020 0.032* 0.023 0.026** 0.020*** 0.017 0.039** 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.001) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.012) (0.001) (0.014) (0.017) 
Year dummy 2002 0.039* 0.008 0.018*** 0.000 0.026 0.033 0.006 0.013*** -0.006 0.026 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.001) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.000) (0.016) (0.019) 
Year dummy 2004 0.047* 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.031** 0.067*** 0.037 0.034** 0.032*** 0.019 0.080*** 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.001) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.013) (0.001) (0.017) (0.021) 
           
           
Constant -5.617*** -5.269*** -5.071*** -4.874*** -4.452*** -5.708*** -5.386*** -5.197*** -4.988*** -4.659*** 
 (0.068) (0.058) (0.002) (0.053) (0.085) (0.067) (0.047) (0.002) (0.056) (0.075) 
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Observations 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 15661 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 






Table A6. Pooled Quantile Earnings Regressions for Men  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Pooled .10 Pooled .25 Pooled .50 Pooled .75 Pooled .90 Pooled .10 Pooled .25 Pooled .50 Pooled .75 Pooled .90 
           
Informal Sector Worker -0.123*** -0.050* 0.026 0.124*** 0.198***      
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.024) (0.031) (0.064)      
Informal Self-Emp. Worker      0.024 0.113*** 0.235*** 0.424*** 0.627*** 
      (0.045) (0.036) (0.025) (0.030) (0.050) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker      -0.150*** -0.066* -0.053* -0.019 0.002 
      (0.044) (0.039) (0.027) (0.033) (0.059) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.473*** 0.554*** 0.703*** 0.903*** 1.010*** 
      (0.107) (0.073) (0.064) (0.088) (0.123) 
           
Constant -6.385*** -5.893*** -5.475*** -5.097*** -4.881*** -6.541*** -6.029*** -5.571*** -5.250*** -5.152*** 
 (0.180) (0.090) (0.080) (0.081) (0.145) (0.184) (0.094) (0.073) (0.082) (0.127) 
           
Observations 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include the set of control variables present in Tables A1 to A5 nine commune dummies and nine 
branch activity dummies.  
Table A7. Pooled Quantile Earnings Regressions for Women 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Pooled .10 Pooled .25 Pooled .50 Pooled .75 Pooled .90 Pooled .10 Pooled .25 Pooled .50 Pooled .75 Pooled .90 
           
Informal Sector Worker -0.470*** -0.268*** -0.156*** -0.087** -0.097      
 (0.058) (0.046) (0.036) (0.039) (0.072)      
Informal Self-Emp. Worker      -0.298*** -0.054 0.065 0.151*** 0.239*** 
      (0.074) (0.049) (0.041) (0.042) (0.072) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker      -0.692*** -0.513*** -0.362*** -0.234*** -0.184** 
      (0.083) (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.073) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.354** 0.302*** 0.490*** 0.587*** 0.637*** 
      (0.140) (0.114) (0.102) (0.100) (0.183) 
           
Constant -6.435*** -6.048*** -5.506*** -5.234*** -4.830*** -6.641*** -6.139*** -5.598*** -5.361*** -5.045*** 
 (0.157) (0.147) (0.099) (0.095) (0.138) (0.144) (0.131) (0.094) (0.078) (0.137) 
           
Observations 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include the set of control variables present in Tables A1 to A5 nine commune dummies and nine 
branch activity dummies.  
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Table A8. Fixed Effects Quantile Earnings Regressions for Men  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES FE .10 FE .25 FE .50 FE .75 FE .90 FE .10 FE .25 FE .50 FE .75 FE .90 
           
Informal Sector Worker -0.118*** -0.091*** -0.010** 0.068*** 0.133***      
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.005) (0.024) (0.034)      
Informal Self-Emp. Worker      -0.079* 0.018 0.146*** 0.253*** 0.376*** 
      (0.045) (0.024) (0.008) (0.025) (0.032) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker      -0.146*** -0.090*** -0.040*** 0.004 0.049 
      (0.038) (0.028) (0.010) (0.030) (0.036) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      0.037 0.192*** 0.323*** 0.461*** 0.625*** 
      (0.073) (0.051) (0.022) (0.061) (0.063) 
           
Constant -5.751*** -5.337*** -5.158*** -4.971*** -4.586*** -5.800*** -5.417*** -5.289*** -5.107*** -4.780*** 
 (0.099) (0.064) (0.018) (0.061) (0.100) (0.103) (0.054) (0.022) (0.063) (0.088) 
           
Observations 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 8585 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include the set of control variables present in Tables A1 to A5 nine commune dummies and nine  
branch activity dummies.  
Table A9. Fixed Effects Quantile Earnings Regressions for Women  
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Real Earnings  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES FE .10 FE .25 FE .50 FE .75 FE .90 FE .10 FE .25 FE .50 FE .75 FE .90 
           
Informal Sector Worker -0.149*** -0.099*** -0.075*** -0.014 0.048      
 (0.047) (0.032) (0.003) (0.028) (0.050)      
Informal Self-Emp. Worker      -0.055 -0.016 0.054*** 0.134*** 0.264*** 
      (0.051) (0.033) (0.002) (0.034) (0.047) 
Informal Sector Wage Worker      -0.224*** -0.220*** -0.186*** -0.107*** -0.034 
      (0.051) (0.034) (0.004) (0.038) (0.045) 
Formal Self-Emp. Worker      -0.038 -0.051 0.110** 0.271*** 0.338*** 
      (0.097) (0.074) (0.050) (0.077) (0.114) 
           
Constant -5.368*** -5.060*** -4.809*** -4.599*** -4.261*** -5.448*** -5.094*** -4.882*** -4.683*** -4.399*** 
 (0.098) (0.088) (0.005) (0.078) (0.115) (0.108) (0.089) (0.007) (0.080) (0.124) 
           
Observations 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 7076 
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phases 1, 2000-2004, DIAL/INSTAT; authors' calculations. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions also include the set of control variables present in Tables A1 to A5 nine dummies and nine branch activity 
dummies.  
